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Polish far right activists hold anti-EU banner as they take part in a
demonstration in Warsaw against accepting immigrants. (via Yahoo news)
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How should mainstream parties react to increasing Euroscepticism among voters? Robert
Rohrschneider and Stephen Whiteﬁeld argue that the failure of mainstream parties to alter their
positions on European integration in light of these shifts in public opinion has left a signiﬁcant
representational gap for extreme anti-integration parties to ﬁll. They notice a diﬀerence between
western European and eastern European countries, remarking that the latter have better managed
to integrate growing scepticism about the EU, although the examples of Hungary and Poland
demonstrate that the adoption of Eurosceptic stances is by no means a ﬁrewall against extreme
politics.
European parties are currently facing a signiﬁcant strain as they seek to represent increasingly
diverse voters. Our previous conclusions on the topic were largely positive: until 2007, parties in
western Europe and eastern Europe did a pretty good job of articulating the preferences of citizens.
The growth of public Euroscepticism since the ﬁnancial (and other) crisis in 2007, however, has
raised a new representational challenge for Europe’s parties and it is one that mainstream parties,
particularly in western Europe, are largely failing to address.
Essentially, mainstream parties have chosen not to
shift their positions on European integration to take
account of shifts in public opinion. They have thereby
left a substantial representational opening for
extreme anti-integration parties to take up. Figure 1
shows that mainstream parties stayed largely positive
about integration between 2007 and 2013, whereas
extreme parties (i.e., those at either the left or right
ideological extremes) even more clearly oppose the
EU by 2013. Note that even though extremist parties,
especially in western Europe, were already very
sceptical in 2007, they have become signiﬁcantly
more critical of the EU by 2013. In contrast,
mainstream parties sustained their support for
Europe during this time. We observe a comparable
development in central and eastern Europe, though
in more muted form.
Figure 1: Party support for European integration
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Note: The chart shows mean scores on an additive three-item scale. A score of 21 indicates
‘strong support’ for European integration, while a score of 1 indicates ‘strong opposition’.
The western European parties have ﬁgures for 2008 and 2013, while the eastern European
parties’ ﬁgures refer to 2007 and 2013. For more information on how parties are categorised,
see the authors’ recent article in European Union Politics
Why then have mainstream parties sustained their pro-EU stances? After all, should they not have incentives to pick
up and maintain votes by becoming more critical of integration? It seems that this ‘Downsian’ logic has not played
out in practice. We think this is a consequence of two interrelated dynamics that result from the relatively weak
‘integration of integration’ into the main lines of political competition among parties, especially in western Europe.
Eastern Europe is diﬀerent but in a way that starkly highlights our ﬁndings.
In western Europe, mainstream parties have historically won power by competing on issues that have largely
excluded the integration dimension. Elites, in fact, have treated the integration project as a matter of elite
consensus. Accordingly, their policy responses to the economic crisis have been to rescue the euro and the
integration project, at considerable expense both ﬁnancially and in terms of public support.
As a result of the historical consensus over integration and their policy behaviour throughout the crisis, governing
parties in particular are reputationally linked to integration in the public mind. By contrast, extreme parties, likely for
ideological but also strategic reasons, have been seeking to build their support by taking up issues like integration
where they can establish ownership, given mainstream parties rarely oﬀer a critical choice on such issues. This will
often entail taking extreme positions to highlight their diﬀerence from the mainstream.
What is the result of these reputational and strategic considerations when integration goes wrong in the public
mind? Mainstream parties face a quandary. On the one hand, they want to continue to ﬁght elections on the old lines
of division where they oﬀer to voters well-rehearsed policy options. On the other, they fear that shifting their stances
to a more Eurosceptic position may well only enhance the credibility of anti-integration parties who have come to
‘own’ these issues. As a result, at least until now, they have generally decided to maintain the status quo and hope
that the old divisions will trump the new ones in the eyes of voters. Unfortunately for them, and perhaps the
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European project, the rising salience of integration in the public mind has meant that their strategy has largely failed.
David Cameron’s hope of ‘shooting UKIP’s fox’ by oﬀering a referendum on EU membership strikes us as an
exception to the mainstream strategy that proves the rule: by shifting in a sceptical direction, the Conservative Party
did little to dampen the rise of UKIP. Only the huge disproportionality of the UK electoral system prevented major
UKIP gains in the last general election. And of course, the concession by Cameron to sceptical opinion means that
we have a very uncertain referendum on EU membership to look forward to.
Extreme parties, however, display a diﬀerent but entirely intelligible logic of competition. As our ﬁndings show, faced
by rising public scepticism, anti-integration parties have become even more anti-integration than they already were
at the outset of the crisis. Those that have survived over the last few years are much more sceptical than they were
previously. And new sceptical entrants are the most sceptical of all. This makes sense in light of expectations of
party competition: as the issue becomes more salient, and mainstream parties only oﬀer a pro-European choice,
new parties competing on the issue appeal to voters by oﬀering a clear stance against the EU.
Parties in post-communist EU countries, however, have better integrated growing scepticism about the EU into their
platforms. European integration issues in post-communist democracies have been a much stronger presence in
party competition since the emergence of democratic politics in the 1990s, in large part because a return to
democracy and the market also meant a return to Europe. This has meant that mainstream eastern European
parties have always ‘integrated integration’ into their appeals and so the issue has not been left purely to a niche of
extreme anti-integration parties.
This has meant that mainstream eastern European parties have been more willing than their western European
counterparts to take up Euroscepticism after the crisis. But, the fact that eastern European party competition
operates within a diﬀerent dynamic may not be much of a ﬁrewall against extreme politics, as the cases of Fidesz in
Hungary and Law and Justice in Poland amply demonstrate.
We ﬁnd this worrying for a number of reasons. First, because we believe that European integration in some form is
of great importance and ﬁnding common solutions to Europe’s problems will be made much more diﬃcult if only
extreme anti-integration parties represent voters’ concerns. Second, because we note that extreme anti-integration
parties tend to be extreme on many other issues as well, particularly on connected questions of cultural and
migration politics. Their entry into the electoral arena through their representation of scepticism about integration
brings much more troublesome baggage to politics.
Please read our comments policy before commenting.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics. To read more about the research underpinning this post, read the authors’
recent article in European Union Politics.
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